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Abstract: 
There have been no in depth studies of post Socialist transition in the Middle East. Syria’s 
experience is therefore a useful one to explore given its historically important role in the 
region.  
The Socialist economic policy followed in Syria from 1963 to the early 1990s is outlined. The 
Syrian economic transition was in two phases: an incremental liberalization phase and a 
transition to Social Market Economy phase. 
During both phases, Syrian policy makers showed a preference for a gradualist approach to 
economic transition, rather than a big-bang approach. This was facilitated by oil revenues 
and subsidies from the Gulf states. The Syrian experience therefore has its own distinct 
characteristics, as well as elements in common with the transitions in other post Socialist 
economies.  
Key Words: Transition Economies; Syria; the Middle East. 
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Transition Economies in the Middle East: the Syrian Experience 
1. Introduction 
The primary idea of economic transition is to replace the institutions of a centrally planned 
economy with those of a market-based economy (Newman, 2000, Meyer, 2001). Institutions 
are ‘the rules of the game in a society’ which determine the incentives and barriers faced by 
economic players (North, 1990). Studies which focus on transition economies require a 
certain level of understanding of their context. Since there have been no in depth studies of 
economic transition in the Middle East, Syria, which is an important country within this 
region, is an appropriate case study. 
From 8th March 1963, the ruling Syrian Socialist Ba’th Party adopted Socialism as its 
ideology for the Syrian economy. However, as is explained later, fundamental problems in the 
Socialist economic policy started to appear and, as a result of these problems, a deep 
recession struck the Syrian economy during the 1980s. Initially, the Syrian government tried 
to implement incremental economic reforms in an attempt to obtain support from the private 
sector to overcome these problems. However, these attempts failed to make any significant 
improvements to the Syrian economy. Therefore, in 2005, the Syrian government decided to 
begin a transition to a Social Market Economy; a market-based economic model which 
stresses two major concepts: free market forces and social welfare issues (Raphaeli, 2007). 
The Syrian economic transition has been disrupted by an ongoing uprising against the 
government, which has been taking place since March 2011. The rising intensity of violence 
across the country has severely damaged the Syrian economy, which was estimated to have 
contracted by almost 19% in 2012. Moreover, the success of the armed opposition in 
maintaining a strong presence in many strategic locations made the Syrian government more 
concerned about its survival than how to improve the country’s economy. As a result, the 
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Syrian government has shifted its economic policy to finance the army and obtain public 
support by, for example, paying the wages of public sector employees even in areas under 
opposition control (PRS, 2014). 
Nevertheless a study of the Syrian experience as an economy in transition since the early 
1990s is helpful for achieving a good level of understanding of similar contexts. Therefore, 
the paper explains the rationale for the Syrian government’s decision to move towards a 
market-based economy and its chosen path for the transition. This requires an explanation of 
the main characteristics and performance of its previous Socialist economy. Therefore, 
Section B starts by explaining the Syrian economic experience under Socialist ideology. 
Section C explains the various events that triggered the economic transition. Section D 
outlines the Syrian government’s chosen approach to and path for Syria’s economic transition 
towards a market-based economy. Conclusions are outlined in Section E. 
2. The Characteristics of the Syrian Economy under Socialist Ideology 
By the mid-1950s, Syria's post-independence capitalist expansion reached a point beyond 
which development seemed to require major social reforms and an increasing role for the 
state, which the Syrian agrarian-commercial bourgeoisie obstructed (Hinnebusch, 1995). In 
March 1963, the Syrian Socialist Ba’th Party, which grew out of this crisis, overthrew the old 
regime and seized power in Syria. Subsequently, it functioned as the only officially 
recognized political party in the country and adopted Socialism as its ideology for the Syrian 
economy (Hopfinger and Boeckler, 1996). 
The Ba’th party created a Leninist-like state which integrated those social forces that had 
either paid the costs or enjoyed few of the benefits of capitalist expansion- peasants, workers, 
rural minorities and intellectuals (Hinnebusch, 1990). Through nationalisations, land reform 
and government control over the market, the Syrian regime destroyed the economic bases of 
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the bourgeoisie; the big latifundia were broken up and industrialists emigrated or left 
businesses (Hinnebusch, 1995). The Syrian version of Socialism, therefore, had much in 
common with those which existed in Communist countries. Its two main characteristics were 
central planning of most economic activities and bureaucratic control of economic 
organisations (Sukkar, 2003). 
Central planning was introduced in Syria in 1963 in order to overcome some of the alleged 
problems caused by the capitalist system (Hinnebusch, 1997). These included instability in 
the supply and demand mechanism and the fact that the ‘invisible hand’ of the capitalist 
system, as it was called by Adam Smith, causes high unemployment, overproduction 
problems and economic recessions (Peng, 2000). 
Therefore, bureaucratic control replaced the supply-demand mechanism in Syria for most 
economic transactions in an attempt to attain coordination among economic players, which 
were mainly state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The Ba’th party transferred private property to 
the public sector which became the core of the Syrian economy and the main engine of 
investment (Hopfinger and Boeckler, 1996). In the 1970s, much of nominally private 
agriculture was in state-dependent cooperatives-85% of the small peasants controlling one-
third of the cultivated surface (Hinnebusch, 1989). In industry, the public sector dwarfed a 
massive number of small undercapitalized enterprises: 98% of the 40,000 private 
manufacturing enterprises employed less than ten workers. In 1984, the public sector 
employed one-third of the labour force in industry but produced 78% of gross output 
(Hinnebusch, 1995). 
Syria thus became one of the ‘centrally planned economies’ under which up to one third of 
the world’s population lived at one time (Peng, 2000). The direction of the Syrian economy 
was based on multiyear plans designed by the State Planning Commission, a national 
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planning agency, which co-ordinated the activities of the SOEs (Ericson, 1991). Under Syrian 
Socialism, the decision to enter or exit from the market was taken by the State Planning 
Commission, which also decided on the annual scale and scope of production on behalf of the 
SOEs’ managers. Consequently, variety, quality or customer services and satisfaction were 
not considered by the SOEs’ managers, who were mainly production engineers or politicians 
appointed by the State Planning Commission and who functioned as implementers of orders, 
rather than as decision takers (Korani, 1992). 
State Socialism initially worked well, despite its inherent problems. This was because of the 
availability of basic education, jobs, health care and housing for the majority of the population 
during the 1960s and the 1970s (Goulden, 2011). Indeed the gap between socialist and 
capitalist economies narrowed over the same period (Khanin, 2003, Weigl, 2008). In the case 
of Syria, the inherent problems of socialism were also masked initially by financial assistance 
from Arab Gulf countries during the 1960s, in addition to growing oil revenues during the 
1970s (Hinnebusch, 1997). However, this success did not last for long and fundamental 
problems caused by conceptual and implementation errors in Syrian Socialist economic 
policy started to appear (Sukkar, 2003). As with other countries, Syrian Socialism’s 
fundamental economic problems fell into two groups. 
First of all, there were Coordination Problems which were caused by extreme dependence on 
the State Planning Commission’s bureaucratic coordination of the economic activities of the 
SOEs (Ericson, 1991). This situation resulted in confusion and inconsistency because of the 
continuous revisions and adjustments to economic plans resulting from the State Planning 
Commission’s shortage of the information which was needed to build their plans on a realistic 
and correct basis, as is the situation in market-based systems (Naughton, 1996). Therefore, the 
State Planning Commission was incapable of providing coherent production plans for the 
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dominant public sector and the output targets for the SOEs were always unrealistic. The 
appointment of unqualified managers to SOEs for political reasons, in addition to the rapid 
turnover in such positions, caused a shortage of experienced managers, especially in relation 
to quality and efficiency issues. These SOEs’ managers had no power to adapt their 
production to market conditions. For all these reasons, it was impossible to solve the 
continuous problem of matching SOEs’ outputs to market needs (Hinnebusch, 1995). 
Secondly there were Incentive Problems. The failure of managers to achieve their targets did 
not threaten the existence of SOEs, since failing SOEs were financially supported by the state 
for political reasons. Thus the managers of SOEs’ lost any incentive to increase output as to 
do so would only lead to higher targets in the following year (Tan and Peng, 2003). In 
addition, and in the absence of pressure or incentives to improve performance, little attention 
was paid to competitive strategies and ideas for innovation (Peng and Heath, 1996). It was not 
only SOEs’ managers who lacked incentives to improve performance, but also shop-floor 
employees. This is because the strategy of SOEs as ‘the property of the whole people’ turned 
into ‘the state property belongs to all and to none’, which led to the absence of motivation 
that usually comes from property ownership (Korani, 1992). 
Moreover, paying low wages to SOEs’ managers and employees made them careless and 
obsessed with personal benefits. Shop-floor workers were unmotivated to care about their 
work quality or to cooperate with their managers in solving production problems, since they 
would be paid the same salary, irrespective of performance (Tung, 1981, Walder, 1989). The 
policy of maximizing employment and providing job security worsened the problem as public 
sector workers knew that they would not be dismissed for poor performance (Sukkar, 2007). 
Since skilled workers were paid more in the limited private sector, they usually chose not to 
work for the public sector. If they could not find job opportunities within the private sector, 
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they emigrated. This situation turned the public sector into a provider of mass employment 
opportunities for unskilled workers or for those looking for easy employment opportunities 
depending on their political relationships (Hinnebusch, 1995). 
In the following sections, an explanation is provided for the events which triggered the 
economic reforms and led to the transition decision in Syria. The Syrian government’s chosen 
approach and path towards a market-based economy are then presented. 
3.  Triggering Events of the Syrian Economic Transition  
Syrian SOE managers’ focus on achieving production volume targets meant that profitability 
and cost efficiency were not relevant. Prices of public sector products were simply marked up 
to give only a 10% return on investment. In line with Socialist values, SOEs in many 
industries, e.g. sugar, textiles and fertilizer, had to sell their products near or below their 
production costs. Therefore, financial returns in the public sector were insufficient to fund the 
building of new plants or, at least, to finance major industry upgrades (Hinnebusch, 1995). 
During the 1970s, foreign investment was restricted and Syria tried to be economically 
independent through an extensive focus on industrialisation as a substitute for imports. Public 
investments during this period were financed by increasing oil revenues and aid from other 
Arab countries, while the public sector’s financial contribution to these investments was 
modest due to its insufficient returns (El-Laithy and Abu-Ismail, 2005). 
The focus on industrialisation during this period encouraged mass consumption rather than 
capital accumulation. This caused a dependence on imported capital goods without the 
development of the export capacity needed to earn foreign currency. The inefficiency of the 
export agencies, which mainly operated with a bureaucratic orientation rather than a 
merchandising one, deepened the balance of payments problems. This situation led to 
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bottlenecks in access to raw materials and spare parts for machinery. Therefore, many public 
sector plants had to operate at low capacity when their out-of-date equipment broke down 
(Hopfinger and Boeckler, 1996). 
During the 1980s, oil prices witnessed a dramatic fall and the financial support from the Arab 
Gulf countries was reduced greatly. As a result, the Syrian government’s investment declined, 
and its ability to create new work opportunities became very limited (Hinnebusch, 1995). 
As a result of all these problems, a deep recession struck the Syrian economy during the 
1980s (El-Laithy and Abu-Ismail, 2005). During this recession, Syria experienced shortages 
of foreign exchange, increased debt and sharp falls in income per capita (Hinnebusch, 1997). 
Therefore, a strong rationale for liberalizing the Syrian economy emerged in the early 1990s, 
especially after the termination of its relationship with the former Soviet Union following the 
latter’s collapse in 1991. 
4. The Syrian Economic Transition 
The Syrian government responded to the fundamental problems of its Socialist economy and 
the 1980s economic recession in two major stages. These were firstly the incremental 
liberalization stage and secondly the transition to Social Market Economy stage.  
4.1 The incremental liberalization stage 
By the early 1990s, the Syrian government was convinced that economic liberalization was a 
necessity. However, it believed that liberalization must be adopted cautiously and that private 
sector interests should not control economic policy. In the Syrian government’s view, before 
major public sector reforms or privatizations took place, liberalization must develop a 
dynamic private sector that could absorb the unemployed workforce. In its view, some 
reforms could be made overnight, such as removing private ownership restrictions and 
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liberalizing markets (Weigl, 2008). However, many other reforms would need years and 
perhaps decades to be accomplished, like changing the structure and governance of former 
SOEs and equipping the economy with market-supporting institutions, in the form of laws and 
financial systems (Buck et al., 2000). 
The Syrian government’s cautious approach towards liberalization was attributable in part to 
its awareness of the possible negative consequences of rapid economic liberalization 
(Hinnebusch, 1997). For instance, dropping socialism and moving to a market-based economy 
by undertaking reforms as fast as possible caused a dramatic decline in the level of economic 
activities among the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries after the Socialist bloc’s 
breakup, which led to unstable and oscillating economies (Rosser Jr and Rosser, 2004). This 
approach to economic transition is known as the ‘big bang’ approach and was first adopted by 
Poland (Lipton et al., 1990) in 1990 and was later followed by some other CEE and Newly 
Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (Roberts and Zhou, 2000). 
The Syrian government’s approach could therefore be described as ‘gradualist’ and similar to 
the ones followed by China and, later, Vietnam and Slovenia (Rojec et al., 2004). These 
countries chose to deepen their transition gradually over time by applying incremental and 
partial reforms. They started by reducing the central planning role, liberalizing prices and 
opening their door to foreign direct investment (FDI). Moreover, instead of following an 
aggressive programme of privatization, other forms of ownership were allowed to emerge and 
spread, such as public private ownership (Jefferson and Rawski, 1994). 
Therefore, an incremental liberalization plan was designed in Syria which aimed to encourage 
private sector expansion. Incremental liberalization started by offering concessions to the 
private sector through enacting new legislation and reforming the banking and taxation 
systems. Subsequently, the list of goods which the private sector could not export was 
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shortened, and controls over foreign currency were reduced (El-Laithy and Abu-Ismail, 
2005). 
Muhammed Al-Imadi, the Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade, was the main driver of 
the liberalization process during this period. Previously, he had been persuaded by President 
Hafez Al-Asad to leave his work with the Kuwait Gulf Fund to lead Syria’s economic 
liberalization and was promised full authority to apply the needed economic reforms. 
However, Al-Imadi did not get the required power and had to work patiently and, sometimes, 
to struggle for his reforms (Hinnebusch, 1997). 
Al-Imadi started by issuing a new investment law (Law No.10 for 1991) and showed interest 
in establishing joint venture (private-public) enterprises within the tourism and agriculture 
sectors. He had to struggle against Marxist MPs, who considered the stock market to be a 
lottery, to create a new financial market law. He also had to face Syrian trade unions’ worries 
about bankruptcy and their objections to his attempts to make the public sector operate under 
market rules, which focused on achieving higher financial profits. Furthermore, he sought to 
promote the Syrian economy’s integration into the world market by making progress on 
achieving Syria’s membership of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
by stopping debt repayment exports to the former Soviet Union. Instead, he tried to 
encourage, or sometimes force, local merchants and industrialists to export to the West in 
order to generate more foreign exchange (Hinnebusch, 1997). 
During the first half of the 1990s, the private investments which took place in response to 
these reforms exceeded the state investment budget for the first time since the nationalizations 
of the 1960s. These investments, in addition to the discovery of new oil fields, bolstered the 
recovery of the Syrian economy and led to an average growth rate of 7% (Sukkar, 2001). 
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However, this improvement did not last long. Economic growth slowed to an annual average 
of 2.6% during the second half of the 1990s. This was because there were many weaknesses 
in the business climate that caused a fall in investment from 27% of GDP in 1995 to 17.6% in 
2000. The IMF argued that these weaknesses were basically in public administration, trade 
and exchange regimes, the regulatory and tax environment, and the financial sector (IMF, 
2005). 
Oil formed 70% of Syrian exports and contributed around 50% of the fiscal revenues between 
2001 and 2004. However, the Syrian economy could no longer rely on its oil revenues to 
mask its weaknesses. Oil production fell and was not even able to meet the growing domestic 
demand in 2005. As a consequence, Syria became a net oil importer for the first time in 2006 
(PRS, 2009). 
These facts made the Syrian authorities start to think of building the foundations for a 
growing non-oil economy. This can be seen clearly in the words of Dr. Adib Mayaleh, the 
governor of the Central Bank of Syria, who said, ‘We have to move from an oil economy to 
one based on banking, services and tourism’. He added, ‘Most importantly, we have to 
change the mind-set of Syrians from a Socialist system to a market system’ (Raphaeli, 2007). 
4.2 Transition to a Social Market Economy 
It is clear from the previous discussion that incremental reforms failed to make any significant 
changes to the Syrian economy. The Syrian economist Nabil Sukkar (Sukkar, 2003), who was 
involved in modelling the Syrian economy during the 1990s as part of the government’s 
economic consultation team, attributed this failure to the absence of a clear and coherent 
reform programme. Furthermore, he argued that the incremental reforms were a response to 
the foreign exchange crisis, and were not motivated by a conviction that it was a necessity to 
abandon the former central planning system and to move to a market-based economy. 
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Moreover, the heavy reliance on external aid and oil revenues to hide the serious problems of 
the Socialist economy prevented Syria from achieving sustainable growth rates (Sukkar, 
2003). Therefore, Syria was not prepared to face the challenges of the 21st century. Increasing 
globalisation and growing unemployment put more pressure on the Syrian economy. In order 
to handle these challenges, the IMF suggested that the contribution of private investment to 
GDP should be increased to at least 30% (IMF, 2005). 
The IMF Executive Board argued that generating new resources for growth and income to 
replace the depleting oil reserves and creating new work opportunities to overcome 
unemployment would not be possible by following the same slow reform path. This was 
because ‘a slowdown in the pace of economic reforms could dampen investors’ interest and 
the prevailing political uncertainties will remain a source of vulnerability’ (IMF, 2006). 
Similarly, Sukkar (2001) stated that achieving higher growth rates in Syria would not be 
possible by following the same hesitant reforms. In his opinion, attracting big local and 
foreign investments required strong reforms and a full commitment to a market economy as 
‘Big investments will not come in, if the door is half open and half closed’.  
Therefore, the Syrian government became convinced that in order to achieve significant 
economic and social successes, the 10th five year plan (FYP) (2006 to 2010) must be 
transformation – oriented and in June 2005 the Syrian Ba’th Party’s Congress adopted the 
Social Market Economy as its new ideology for the Syrian economy. The new ideology was 
based on two concepts: following free market forces and stressing social issues (Al-Dardari, 
2006). 
Accordingly, the 10th FYP was designed to move the Syrian economy in this direction and 
was intended to achieve a 7% annual real GDP growth, mainly by diversifying the Syrian 
economy, increasing FDI inflows and extending trade ties. The Ba’th Party’s new ideological 
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approach gave Syrian officials the authority and the courage to move further in the 
liberalization process. Abdallah Al-Dardari, the head of the State Planning Commission at 
that time, and Deputy Prime Minister for economic affairs since 2005, said, ‘Whatever the 
negative consequences of globalization, isolation is far more dangerous for Syria’ (Raphaeli, 
2007). 
Moreover, the 10th FYP adopted an ‘indicative planning policy’ instead of the previous highly 
centralised and compulsory planning process. The ‘indicative planning policy’ approach 
revealed the Syrian government’s preference for incremental liberalisation rather than the big-
bang approach. According to this policy, the state would only direct investment and market 
activities, without dominating or controlling them as it used to do. The government’s 10th 
FYP explained this policy approach by saying that the state would try to expand private 
investment opportunities and promote them. Accordingly, the government’s economic 
intervention would be confined to issuing the laws and regulations required for smooth 
market transactions, combating monopolies, regulating competition, providing a suitable 
environment for encouraging local and foreign private investment and ensuring that the 
different market players were socially responsible (Al-Dardari, 2006). 
4.3 Reform Measures after the Transition Decision in 2005   
The Syrian government’s plan to move to a more market-based economy needed a major 
effort to modernise and upgrade the Syrian private sector. However, the needed capital, 
advanced technology and experience were far beyond the capability of the private sector itself 
(Sukkar, 2010). In this situation, FDI can play a vital role in bringing in many of these 
significant ingredients for private sector development and economic transition (Estrin et al., 
2000). Moreover, FDI can speed up the transition process and contribute to a host country’s 
growth (Cipollina et al., 2012) through the various spillovers and the know-how transfers 
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which can be generated from the advanced technology brought in by foreign enterprises 
(Stephan, 2011), and by encouraging organizational restructuring which can provide more 
effective corporate governance (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
Therefore, among the many issues which the Syrian government needed to tackle after taking 
the transition decision, the attraction of more FDI inflows was a major priority. By 2009, 
Syria had witnessed a 70% increase in its FDI inflows as a response to the new business 
opportunities resulting from Syria’s growing economic openness and its better international 
relationships with other countries (UNCTAD, 2009). Moreover, in January 2009, an IMF 
report about Syria commended the annual average growth of non-oil GDP of 7% between 
2004 and 2008, declining low government debt and the healthy level of foreign reserves. The 
IMF Executive Directors attributed the strong performance of Syria’s overall macroeconomic 
environment during that period to the government’s reforms, which aimed to move the Syrian 
economy in a more market-based direction (IMF, 2005). These reforms can be put into two 
major groups (Figure1): policy reforms and business facilitation activities. 
In terms of policy reforms, since the transition decision was taken in 2005, the most important 
type of policy change in Syria was the liberalization of FDI policies. This consisted of the 
reform of core rules and regulations governing the entry and operations of FDI and the 
standards of treatment accorded to foreign investors and the functioning of the markets within 
which they operate. For instance, since the early days of the 10th Five Year Plan (FYP) (2006 
to 2010), the Syrian government took many measures to reform the financial sector with the 
aim of achieving a gradual implementation of market-based tools for conducting monetary 
policy, instead of the previous administrative tools. The most noticeable reaction to these 
reforms was the expansion of private banks. By September 2009, there were 12 private banks 
15 
 
established in Syria with assets equivalent to about 24 per cent of total Syrian banking sector 
assets (IMF, 2010).  
Figure 1 The Syrian government institutional reforms to move towards a more market-based economy (2005-2010) 
 
The Syrian government took many other initiatives to equip the Syrian economy with suitable 
legislative tools that could move it to a more market-based economy. These legislative 
initiatives tried to open the Syrian economy for private investment in general, and FDI in 
particular, and were necessary to regulate the functions and the relationships among economic 
players. For example, in January 2007, the Syrian government enacted Legislative Decree 
No.8 to replace investment law No.10 of 1991. The aims of Legislative Decree No.8 were to 
make the Syrian investment environment friendlier for private investments through offering 
them various incentives. For instance, it allowed private investors (foreigners and locals) to 
own or lease the land and buildings needed for establishing or expanding their investment 
projects (PRS, 2011). 
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The Syrian government efforts for creating a friendlier environment for FDI also included 
trade policy liberalization initiatives and new international trade agreements. For example, a 
fully revised list of goods that could not be imported was issued in April 2008. Many goods 
were no longer banned from import (PRS, 2009). Moreover, in 2005, Syria joined the Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). This agreement included the following 17 Arab countries: 
Bahrain, Libya, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Iraq, Oman, Tunisia, 
Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait, Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. As a result of the 
GAFTA, trade was fully liberalized among these 17 Arab countries including Syria (ECSEI, 
2012). In addition to the GAFTA as a regional integration agreement, Syria signed a bilateral 
free-trade agreement with Turkey, which came into force in January 2007 (PRS, 2009). 
Through this agreement and the economic co-operation between them, both Syria and Turkey 
aimed to create conditions which would encourage investments, especially joint ones, in both 
countries. For example, the agreement stated that trade and commercial transactions and 
payments between both parties should be free from any restrictions, such as those on currency 
exchange. 
All the institutional changes presented above aimed to create a friendly investment 
environment and a level playing field that could enable FDI to take place in the newly 
opening economy of Syria. Such institutional changes were accompanied by complementary 
measures to facilitate foreign investment activities undertaken in Syria (UNCTAD, 1998). 
Such measures included promotional actions, counselling, offering assistance to obtain the 
required permits, accelerating the stages of the approval process and the provision of after-
investment services. These measures are important for transition economies, due to their role 
in eliminating bureaucratic barriers facing foreign investors (UNCTAD, 1995) and for 
improving these economies’ poor image as destinations not friendly to FDI (Wells and Wint, 
2000). 
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On 27 January 2007, the Syrian Investment Authority (SIA) was established by Article III of 
Decree No.9 to offer most of the above-mentioned business facilitations. This Authority was 
expected to play an important role in implementing the new investment policies and in 
achieving their goals by enhancing the investment environment (UNCTAD, 2009). According 
to the same decree, it was the responsibility of the SIA to simplify and facilitate investment 
procedures, to promote investment projects, to track projects’ implementation and overcome 
obstacles that hinder their implementation and continuation. Most importantly, the Syrian 
Investment Authority was required to establish a one-stop shop, which was responsible for 
registering, licensing, granting approvals and certificates required by legislation in force, 
following up on-going projects, identifying their constraints and coming up with solutions for 
them. 
5.  Conclusion 
In almost all transition economies, with the partial exception of China, establishing efficient 
markets has been slower than expected (Bhaumik and Estrin, 2007). Reforms have been 
turbulent, complex, sporadic and unpredictable, causing institutional frameworks to be 
incomplete during the transition period (Sumon Kumar et al., 2007). This has led, in many 
cases, to the emergence of blurred legal frameworks, underdeveloped judicial systems, rigid 
bureaucracy and corruption, especially as informal institutions (e.g. cultures, norms, customs, 
values and conventions) change much more slowly than formal ones (e.g. regulations, written 
rules, laws and contracts) and are not easily changed by legislation (Šimić Banović, 2015, 
Svejnar, 2002). 
Syria was in transition towards a market-based economy from the early 1990s. The economic 
transition started cautiously following an approach which was based on incremental 
liberalization. The cautious approach was attributed partially to the Syrian government’s 
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awareness of the dramatic consequences of rapid economic liberalization experiences, such as 
those of Egypt (Hinnebusch, 1997) and Poland (Sachs, 1993). However, incremental 
liberalization failed to make any significant improvement to the Syrian economy due to the 
absence of a clear and coherent reform programme. In addition there was a strong and deep 
psychological and emotional attachment to classical Socialist ideology amongst key elements 
of the Syrian political elite.  
Therefore in June 2005, the Syrian government announced the Social Market Economy as its 
new ideology for the Syrian economy; and its 10th FYP was designed to move the Syrian 
economy in this direction. Yet, the government’s cautious and gradual approach to transition 
was still evident as it adopted an ‘indicative planning policy’ for its new plan for Syrian 
economic transition. 
Despite its further transition being interrupted since 2011 by the ongoing conflict, Syria 
provides a case study of a transition economy from a region, the Middle East, which has not 
been explored before. This paper shows the distinctive features of the Syrian transition 
economy, such as the ameliorating role of oil, as well as its similarities to other economies in 
terms of the rationale for and the path of transition. Therefore, this paper makes an important 
contribution to the understanding of post Socialist transition economies. 
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